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RECENT CASES
as when he represented the creditors.? The rule of civil procedure which pro-
vides for compulsory counterclaims contemplates situations where the pri-
mary parties - the cross-plaintiff and at least one cross-defendant - are be-
fore the court as parties to an action which arises out of the same "transac-
tion or occurrance".J
The rnle as stated in the cited cases appears to be that!the':demands must
be mutual, between the same parties, and in the same capacitj. A judgment
against one as an individual does not bind him as executor, nor does one
against him as executor bind him as an individual in a subsequent action,
although, the issue is identical and the decision in the first actioi:'was upon
its merits.
7
While actions by ; he -same individual in different capacities, 'ire treated as
actions brought formally in dilferent capacities, but actually for the ultimate
benefit of the same Ierson, are by the same person.8 This view appears to be
a minority with the great weight of authority supporting the theory that the
parties must also be aceting in the same capacity.
ALAN WARCUP.
TRIAL- PREJUDICIAL ERnot -- DISCLOSURE O.F DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE.- In a damage suit resulting from an automobile accident, plaintiff
was asked by his attorney who took the statement of facts following the ac-
cident. Plaintiff answered that he was unaware of the person's name, but
thought he was an insurance man. Defendant's motion for a mistrial was
overruled, but the court admonished the jury not to consider the matter of
insurance. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the reference to in-
surance was voluntary and not responsive and the prompt admonition to the
jury removed any prejudicial effect. Ragon v. Day, 306 S.W.2d 687 (Ark.
1957).
A majority of the courts, bold that in an action for personal injury or
death, the disclosure of the fact that the defendant is protected by liability
insurance is inadmissible and ground for mistrial. 2 Such evidence is inad-
missible because it does not bear on the issue of negligence and tends to
5. Campbell v. Aahler, 320 Mass. 475, 70 N.E.2d 302 (1946). See also In re
Kenin's Estate, 346 Pa. 1:27, 29 A.2d 495 (1942), where the court held that in an action
by an individual, a claim against hirn as executor or administrator cannot be pleaded as
a set-off.
6. . Stevenson v. Reid, 96 A.2d 268 (Mon. Ct. of App. for D.C. 1953); Ruzicka v.
"Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953); Rose v. Motes, 220 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.
Civ App. 1949). See Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va. 785, 51 S.E.2d 239 (1949).
7. First Nat'l Bank i. Shuler, 153 N.Y. 163, 47 N.E. 262 (1897).
8. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1925); In re Parks
Estate, 166 Iowa 403, 147 N.W. 850 (1914). See Clark, Code Pleading, p. 479 n.157
(2nd ed. 1947). But see Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1949).
1. See, e.g., Garee v. MeDonell, 116 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 561 (1941); Johnson v. Stotts, 344 Il. App. 614, 101 N.E.2d 880 (1951);
Carls Markets v. Meyer, 69 So.2d -89, (Fla. 1953); 21, Appleman, Insurance Law &
Practice § 12832 (1947). But see Crum, Counterclaims and Third-Party Practice, 39 N.
Dak. L. Rev. 7, 24 (1958) as to joining an insurance company as an outright code-
fendant.
2. See Beardsley, v. Ewing, 40 N.D. 373, 168 N.W. 791 (1918). ("The trial
judge, who has the advantage of the atmosphere of the trial can best determine the ex-
tent of the threatened prejudice, and can take precautionary. measures . . . even to the
extent of granting a new trial.")
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effectuate excessive verdicts. 3  However, there are several exceptions to the
general rule. Thus, it is not error (1) where it is material to establishing a
cause of action and liability of the defendant; 4 (2) where insurance is used
to show bias of a witness due to his relationship with an insurance com-
pany; 5 (3) where the insurer is a party to the proceeding at the time;6 (4)
where the evidence concerning insurance is introduced by the insured; 7 (5)
where the reference to insurance stems from an unresponsive answer to a
proper question.8
The instant case falls within the well recognized above exception that
evidence of liability insurance introduced by an unresponsive, answer to a
proper question does not constitute reversible error.9 It is highly probable
that North Dakota courts would reach the same result.10 Where the ref-
erence to insurance was not deliberate and malicious it is largely in the dis-
cretion of tho trial court whether the error is so prejudicial as to require a
mistrial.11
In view of the almost universal custom of automobile owners to carry lia-
bility insurance and of the juror's knowledge of such custom, 1 2 it is not as
prejudicial to a fair trial as in earlier times. 13  This is evidenced by the fact
that courts will now refuse to declare a mistrial unless the damages are great-
ly execessive or the evidence clearly shows the defendant was not liable.14
JAMES W. JOHNSON.
3. Leishman v. Taylor, 199 Ore. 546, 263 P.2d 605 (1953); Buehler v. Festns
Mercantile Co., 343 Mo. 139, 119 S.W.2d .961 (1938).
4. Cook-O'Brien Co. v. Crawford, 26 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1928); Freeman v. Nick-
erson, 77 Cal. App. 2d 40, 174 P.2d 688 (1946).
5. Fleischman v. City of Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957); Barton
Plumbing Co. v. Johnson, 285 S.W,2d 780 (Tex. C'v. App. 1955).
6. Engler v. Hatton, 129 S.WV.2d 990, (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1929); Vuchetich v.
General Cas. Co., 270 Wis. 552, 72 N.W.2d 389 (1955) (statutory).
7. Turner v. Modern Beauty Supply, 152 Fla. 3, 10 So.2d 488 (1942); Chileult v.
Keating, 220 Miss. 545, 71 So.2d 472 (1954).
8. Garee v. McDonell, 116 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 561
(1941); Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal. App. 2d 349, 37 P.2d 99 (1934).
9. See note 8 supra.
10. See Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d 537 (1951).
11. Johnson v. Stotts, 344 111. App. 614, 101 N.E.2d 880 (1951); Doheny v.
Cloverdale, 104 Mont. 534, 68 P.2d 142 (1937); 21 Appleman, Insurance Law & Prac-
tice, § 12837 (1947).
12. Moniz v. Bittencourt, 24 Cal. App. 718, 76 P.2d 535 (1938).
13. North Dakota Financial Responsibility Act, N. D. Rev. Code § 39-16 (Supp.
1957).
14. Bloxom v. McCoy, 178 Va. 343, 17 S.E.2d 401 (1941); 21 Appleman, Insur-
ance Law & Practice, § 12838 (1947), which raises the question whether it may be
more prejudicial to prevent defendant from showing he is uninsured than showing he is
insured. For an excellent, brief discussion of liability insurance see McCormick, Evi-
dence c. 19 (1954).
